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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD L. BAXTER and SHIRLEY 
DIANE BAXTER, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD., a 
Utah Corporation, 
An Involuntary 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant, Third-
Party Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT REES DANSIE and MARIE 
GROW DANSIE, his wife; DAVIS 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; DAVIS 
COUNTY ASSESSOR; DAVIS 
COUNTY RECORDER; and WEBER 
COUNTY, a Body Politic of 
the State of Utah, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
Case No. 860562 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRAKSPORTATION, DAVIS AMD WEBER COUNTIES 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Insofar as the Respondents, Utah Department of 
Transportation, Weber County and Davis County are concerned, 
there are no issues to be decided by the Supreme Court and 
consequently, the Judgment of the Lower Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellants instituted this action to quiet title to 
a six acre tract of land located at the mouth of Weber Cannon. 
The Appellants purchased this six acre tract as a part of an 18 
acre tract of land from Respondent, Davis County, at a tax sale. 
The Respondents asserted in their responsive pleadings that the 
Appellants did not have title to the property because it was 
located in Weber County. A trial was held before Judge Ronald 0. 
Hyde who determined that the property was located in Weber County 
and consequently, quieted title in the Respondent, Utah Depart-
ment of Transportation. 
The Lower Court bifurcated the trial of the issues in 
this case. It was determined to first try the issue of whether 
the property was located in Weber County. If the Appellants lost 
on this issue, which they did, there was no reason to then try 
the issue of whether the Respondent, Davis County, conducted the 
tax sale properly. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Just prior to May 25, 1964, the Third-Party Defendant, 
Robert Dansie (he was a Utah attorney who is now deceased), 
hereinafter referred to as "DANSIE," was the owner of approxi-
mately 24.41 acres located near Uintah Junction where the Weber 
River intersects with U.S. Highway 89. The property in question, 
according to the Davis County plat maps, was located north of the 
existing Weber River. (R. 328). 
In May of 1964, the Respondent, Utah Department of 
Transportation, purchased the property in question by Right-of-
Way Contract (R. 330, D-23) and Warranty Deed from the Third-
Party Defendant, Robert Dansie. (R. 329, D-22). The Deed was 
recorded in Davis County on June 17, 1964, but the Respondent, 
Davis County, only recognized, for recordation purposes, the 
description in the Deed which followed the portion of property 
which was designated "also in Davis County." (R. 329). This 
particular description involved a small tract of property which, 
in fact, was situated south of the Weber River. The Deed in 
question was then later sent to the Respondent, Weber County, 
for recordation. The Deed was held by the Respondent, Weber 
County, until September of 1970, when if finally received a 
recordation seal. (R. 329). The Respondent, Davis County, 
refused to recognize the validity of the Deed and so the Deed was 
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changed so that Davis County would finally recognize the Deed for 
recordation purposes. The Deed was then re-recorded as a lis 
pendens to prevent further transfers of the property. (R. lllf 
112) . 
The taxes on the property in question were not paid 
for the years of 1964 through 1968 in Davis County and conse-
quently/ came up for tax sale in May of 1969. Apparently/ both 
Davis and Weber County had been each taxing the same property. 
The parties who purchased the property at the Kayf 1969/ tax sale 
(R. 410/ P-2)/ were Thomas Holberg [Rio Vista, Involuntary 
Plaintiff/ that Default Judgment was entered against (R. 287)] 
Ronald Baxter (Appellant) and Ronald Toonef [Plaintiff in Civil 
No. 20915/ (R. 106-107)]. The Appellant/ Mr. Baxter, is 
currently an engineer for the Utah Department of Transportation 
and was alsof at the time he purchased at tax sale the property 
which his employer/ the Respondent/ Utah Department of Trans-
portation, had previously purchased from Dansie. (T. 183/ R. 
696) . The facts appear to be that the Respondent/ Davis County, 
probably sent tax and sale notices to Dansie for the years in 
question, but the Appellant/ Utah Department of Transportation, 
did not receive any such notices. Dansie/ since he had 
previously sold the property/ disregarded the tax notices from 
the Respondent/ Davis County. The Respondent, Weber County, 
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did not attempt to assess taxes on the property in question, 
since they recognized the Respondent, Utah Department of Trans-
portation, as the lawful owner of the property in question. 
(R. 85)• 
The tax sale purchasers, Holberg (Involuntary Plain-
tiff) , Baxter (Appellant) and Toone (Plaintiff in Civil No. 
20915), then divided the property, each taking six (6) acres and 
paid taxes to Davis County until 1978. (R. 697, T. 144). 
In January of 1975, the tax sale purchasers and the 
Respondent, Davis County, were notified of the invalidity of the 
tax sale. (R. 43). 
In August of 1975, a contractor for the Respondent, 
Utah Department of Transportation, LeGrande Johnson Construction 
Company, entered upon a portion of the 18 acres in question and 
set up a gravel crushing operation. Shortly thereafter, one of 
the tax sale purchasers, Ronald Toone, in Civil No. 20915 in 
Davis County, commenced a damage action against LeGrande Johnson 
Construction Company. (R. 85, 86). 
The foregoing action in Civil No. 20915, resulted in 
a Judgment against the Plaintiff on December 13, 1976. (R. 106-
107, copy attached, marked Exhibit "A"). The Plaintiff, Toone, 
was represented by Mr. Glen E. Fuller, the same attorney who is 
now representing the current Plaintiffs. (R. 106). The Trial 
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Court found that the property in question was not located in 
Davis County and, therefore, was improperly assessed and sold at 
tax sale. (R. 106-107). At least 10 maps were shown to the jury 
from 1892 to the present time which established the location of 
the Weber River. The Plaintiffs attempted by parole evidence to 
dispute the ten maps in question. The Judgment was then recorded 
in Davis County. (R. 106-107). During the pendency of the Toone 
action, a Motion to Join the other tax sale purchasers (Baxter 
and Holberg) was made to the Court which the Plaintiffs opposed 
and the Court denied. (R. 49). 
As a result of the Toone Judgment, Davis County then 
abated and refunded the taxes which the Appellants in the present 
action had previously paid. (R. 108, 109). Then the Respondent, 
Davis County, marked its plats and tax records reflecting that 
the entire 18 acres in question were located in Weber County. 
(R. 110) . Since 1978 to the present, none of the three tax sale 
purchasers have paid taxes on the 18 acres in question and Davis 
County has neither assessed the 18 acres in question nor accepted 
any taxes with respect to it. (R. 722, 723). 
The current Appellants in Civil No. 74206, filed 
their Notice of Claim in May of 1978 (R. 4, 5), and their 
Complaint (R. 1-3) in May of 1979, in the District Court of Davis 
County. The Davis County Court then granted the Respondent, Utah 
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Department of Transportation's Motion for a Change of Venue to 
Weber County. The Davis District Court presumptively ruled that 
the property in question was shown to be in Weber County. 
(R. 33-35). After the case was removed to Weber County the 
Respondent/ Utah Department of Transportation, then filed its 
Answer and Third-Party Complaint. (R. 62-68). 
The present Appellants feel they should be allowed to 
retry the issue of the location of the Weber-Davis County line. 
The six (6) acres which was conveyed to the Appellants lies 
immediately east of the six (6) acres which was involved in the 
Toone case and just west of the six (6) acres which Rio Vista 
(Thomas Holberg) acquired/ and allowed Default Judgment to be 
entered against. (R. 287). It must be noted that the entire 18 
acres in question lies north of the Weber River and is bordered 
on the west and north by the freeway. The location of the Weber 
River determined the boundary between the two counties. The 
Appellants' property lies north of the existing Weber River and 
depends upon the validity of a tax sale from the Respondent/ 
Davis County. 
Judge Gould (who was the same Judge who tried the Toone 
quiet title action) then required that the Respondent/ Weber 
County/ and the remaining tax sale purchaser/ Rio Vista Oil Ltd./ 
(company owned by Holberg) be joined in the present action. 
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R. 62-68) . Rio Vista failed to file any type of responsive 
pleading and Default Judgment was then entered. (R. 28). 
The Respondents, Utah Department of Transportation, 
Weber County, and Davis County, then filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in their favor upon the grounds and for the reasons that 
no genuine issue of fact remains to be decided and, therefore, 
Judgment should be granted in its favor as a matter of law. The 
Trial Court then granted the Respondents1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The basis for the District Court granting a Summary 
Judgment was the fact that the present Appellant was an 
interested witness in the Toone case and also the same issue 
was tried in the earlier case and consequently the present 
Appellant is now collaterally estopped from bringing the present 
action. The Supreme Court rejected these two arguments and 
reversed and remanded the case back to the Lower Court. (R. 326-
327) . 
A Pretrial Hearing was held before Judge David Roth on 
August 4, 1986. The Judge felt the following issues should be 
determined: 
1. In 1866 can it be determined there was a main 
channel of the Weber River at the place in question, yes or no? 
2. If yes, when the main channel of the Weber River 
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was located and described, where was its location? 
3. Was avulsive activity involved subsequent to the 
time the main channel was located and described? (Page 3 8 of the 
Transcript of the Pretrial, copy attached, marked Exhibit "B"). 
The matter proceeded to trial before Judge Ronald Hyde, 
sitting; without a jury on August 26, 1 986. The evidence 
established that as of 1866 the location and or main channel of 
the Weber River could not be established. That a definite 
uncertainty existed as to the location of the boundary between 
Davis and Weber Counties. (The Weber River). The two Counties 
pursuant to Section 86.2 Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, effective 
as of February 20, 1878, (R. 493-494), sought to resolve this 
dispute with a survey of the Weber River. 
Sec. 86.2 Whenever any dispute or uncertainty 
shall arise as to any county boundary, the same 
may be determined by the county surveyors of the 
counties interested, and in case they fail to 
agree, or otherwise fail to establish the boundary, 
the county courts of either or both counties inter-
ested, may engage the services of the aforesaid 
Territorial Commissioner, who, with the said county 
surveyors, or either of them, if but one appear for 
that purpose, shall proceed forthwith to permanently 
determine such boundary line at the expense of the 
counties interested by making the necessary surveys 
and erecting suitable monuments to designate said 
boundaries, which shall be deemed permanent until 
superseded by legislative enactment. Nothing in 
this act shall be construed to give the surveyors, 
mentioned herein, any further authority than to erect 
suitable monuments to designate said boundaries as 
they are now established by law. (1) 
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That in 1894, the surveyors of Davis and Weber Counties 
surveyed the Weber River to determine a metes and bounds 
description of the Weber River. (R. 487). The surveyors1 notes 
expressly state that it was the purpose of the two surveyors "... 
to locate and make boundary lines common to Weber and Davis 
Counties." (D. 2, copy attached, marked Exhibit "C") . The Court 
adopted the 1894 survey as the first time the exact location of 
the Weber River was located and described by a metes and bounds 
description. (R. 485-489). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The issue on the location of the boundary between 
Davis and Weber County has been ruled on by the Lower Court in 
four separate instances. 
In the case of Toone v. LeGrande Johnson Construction 
Company Robert Dansie and Davis County. Civil No. 20915, District 
Court of Weber County (Judge Calvin Gould). This case involved 
the six acres located immediately to the west of the six acres 
involved in the present case. The jury found in the Toone case 
that the six acres located on the west side of the subject six 
acres was located in Weber County. (R. 47-48). 
In the present case, Judge Cornaby presumptively ruled 
that the subject six acres was located in Weber County. (R. 33-
35) . 
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In the present case, Judge Calvin Gould granted the 
Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment with a finding that the 
subject six acres was located in Weber County. (R. 258-259). 
In the present case, the other tax sale purchaser 
Thomas Holberg (Rio Vista Oil) failed to answer and the Lower 
Court granted Default Judgment establishing that the easterly 
contiguous six acres was located in Weber County. (R. 287-288). 
As a consequence of the case of Toone v. LeGrande 
Johnson Construction Company, Civil No. 20915, Davis County 
changed their plat maps, tax rolls and tendered back the prior 
taxes paid by the Appellant. (R. 337-338). 
This matter proceeded to trial on the issue of whether 
the main channel of the Weber River could be located in 1866. 
The Trial Court concluded that the main channel could not be 
located in 1866. Instead the Trial Court was forced to find that 
the location of the Weber River was not described until the 
official survey by the two counties which took place in 1894. 
(R. 515-519). The Court further held that the 1894 survey was 
for the express purpose of resolving the location of the Weber 
River so as to establish the boundary between Weber and Davis 
County. (R. 515-519). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE 
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MAIN CHANNEL OF THE WEBER RIVER WAS UNCERTAIN 
IN 1866 AND THIS DISPUTE WAS RESOLVED IN 1894 
BY A SURVEY OF THE WEBER RIVER. 
Since the time that both Davis and Weber Counties have 
been recognized, the statutes have described the boundary between 
Davis and Weber County as the Weber River. The Trial Court 
specifically found that the main channel of the Weber River was 
not surveyed until 1894. That as a consequence of this 1894 
survey, Respondents, Davis and Weber Counties, accepted the then 
described Weber River as its boundary. (R. 515-518, D-2, copy 
attached, marked Exhibit "D"). 
The formal recognition of these two Counties came at 
the time of Statehood in 1898. Utah Code Ann. Section 17-1-3 
(1953, as amended), states the following: 
Existing counties adopted. The several counties as 
they are in this chapter named and described are the 
counties of the State until otherwise changed by law. 
Section 17-1-9 and 17-1-32 of Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended) then described the boundaries of Davis and Weber 
Counties as the channel of the Weber River. 
The only evidence of where the location of the Weber 
River was prior to 1894 were the GLO Survey notes of 1855, 1871 
and 1886 (D-9, Exhibits "E", "F", and "G"). In 1855 the survey 
notes along the section line show the width of the Weber River to 
be in excess of 700 feet wide and there were two channels of the 
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Weber River. At no time during the trial of this case were any 
legal descriptions provided of the possible location of the Weber 
River either east or west of the Section line. (D-9 Exhibit "E")• 
In 1871, the survey notes show the width of the Weber 
River to be in excess of 900 feet wide (D-9) and show two 
channels but in different locations than depicted by the 1855 
survey (D-9 Exhibit "F"). 
In 1886 the survey notes show the Weber River to be in 
excess of 900 feet wide (D-9 Exhibit "G") . 
The maps which the Appellants have attached to their 
brief were admitted into evidence and were considered by the 
Court in making its ruling. (See attached Exhibit "L".) 
The Appellants relied upon an 1890 railroad map (P-6) 
to establish the location of the Weber River in 1866. The 
Assistant Davis County Recorder could not authenticate or verify 
this particular Exhibit* also that Davis County recorded the map 
in its private survey book and did not rely upon the map. Also* 
there were no legal descriptions contained on the map. (R. 595-
597) . 
The Appellants also relied upon an old assessor map 
(P-7). The Assistant Davis County Recorder could not identify 
the age of the map (R. 600, 602). When Exhibit D-8, which is 
another assessor's map to the west is considered, it shows the 
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Weber River in its present location. (R. 607 Exhibits P-7 and 
D-8 directly conflict with each other)• 
The Davis County Surveyor was called as a witness by 
the Respondents. This witness was asked the following questions: 
QUESTION: Based upon your investigation, Mr. Elliot, 
can you ascertain the location of the main channel of the Weber 
River in 1866? 
ANSWER: I couldn't. No. (R. 570) 
Also, the witness was asked the following questions: 
QUESTION: You've had occasion to familiarize yourself 
with those GLO notes, have you not? 
AHSWER: I have looked at them, yes. 
QUESTION: Can you conclude from these notes where the 
main channel of the river was prior to 1893? 
ANSWER: It appeared in the notes that in some of the 
notes there is two channels and some there's three channels, and 
I would not venture to guess which one was the main channel of 
the Weber River. (R. 563). 
The Weber County Surveyor John Reeve was called as a 
witness. 
QUESTION: I'm going to read to you the wording of the 
statute, Mr. Reeve, and ask if your answer is still the same. 
Can you tell us where the center of the channel of the Weber 
River in 1866 was located? 
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ANSWER: No, I can't. (R. 620) 
Mr. Jack DeMass, Licensed Engineer: 
QUESTION: And based upon your expertise and your in-
vestigation, can you conclude where the channel of the Weber 
River was in 1866? 
ANSWER: No, I can not. (R. 637-638). 
The Appellant, Mr. Ronald Baxter, testified: 
QUESTION: So if we take the 1855 from the right bank 
to the left bank, we've got almost 899 feet. If you go from the 
left bank to the current location, you've got 700 feet. 
ANSWER: 700 plus feet. >. 732). 
The Appellants, on Page 22 of their Brief, concede " • . . 
there was no legal description showing the exact location of the 
Weber River where it flowed in 1866 ..." 
A Review of Findings of Fact is controlled by Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 52(A), which now provides in pertinent 
part: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon.... Findings of facti whether based 
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.l 
Ashton v. Ashton, Sup.Ct. No. 19129 (1987). 
The Respondents feel the case of San Juan County v. 
Grand County. 13 U. 2d 242 (1962) supports the decision of the 
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Lower Court. In this case, the legislature had defined the 
boundary between the two counties as Parallel 38o30' north 
latitude. Apparently the two counties had difficulty locating 
the parallel 38o30'. The Lower Court dismissed both the 
Complaint and Counterclaim because of the parties' failure to 
comply with the provision of Section 17-1-33 U.C.A. 1953, which 
reads as follows and is the successor to 86.2 Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1888, which is cited on Page 9 of Respondents1 Brief: 
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall arise 
as to any county boundary the same may be 
determined by the county surveyors of the counties 
interested, and in case they fail to agree or 
otherwise fail to establish the boundary, the 
board of county commissioners of either or both 
counties interested shall engage the services of 
the state engineer, who with aforesaid county 
surveyors, or either of them, if but one appears 
for that purpose, all having received due and 
property notice, shall proceed forthwith to 
permanently determine such boundary line by 
making the necessary surveys and erecting suit-
able monuments to designate the boundaries, 
which shall be deemed permanent until super-
seded by legislative enactment. Nothing in 
this section shall be construed to give the 
surveyors or state engineer any further authority 
than to erect suitable monuments to designate 
boundaries as they are not established by lav;. 
The Supreme Court held that the boundary between the 
two counties was sufficiently clear and all the counties needed 
to do was follow the statutory procedure in locating the boundary 
upon the face of the earth. 
In the present case, the legislature set the boundary 
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between Webei. and Davis County as the channel of the Weber River. 
The counties then followed the statutory procedure set forth in 
86.2 Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, when because an uncertainty 
existed, the surveyors of Davis and Weber Cc \ mty in 1 894 , jointly 
surveyed the channel of the Weber River to resolve the dispute. 
(D-2). 
The Appellants also cite the case of Barton v. 
Sanpete County. 49 U. 188 (1916). Apparently, a dispute had 
arisen over the boundary between Sanpete and Juab Counties. 
The evidence in the Trial Court supported a finding that, in 
fact, the boundary line between Sanpete and Juab Counties was 
in dispute. The dispute was resolved in 1913 to permanently 
resolve the dispute by enacting a new law. The case is really 
inapplicable to the case at bar. The parties are in agreement 
that the boundary between Weber and Davis Counties was the 
Weber River, but a dispute or uncertainty exists as to the 
exact location of the Weber River. The follow up case to the 
Barton case was Summit v. Rich, 57 U. 553 (1921). In this 
case it was thought that an uncertainty existed as to the 
location of the county boundary between Summit and Rich 
Counties. The matter went before the legislature to enact a new 
law which would resolve this apparent uncertainty. The Supreme 
Court held that the legislature could not enact a new law 
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describing the boundary between the two counties without 
attempting to follow the original description. It only allowed 
the legislature to redefine the county boundary when it found 
that the old description was legally impossible to follow. 
Respondents feel this case has no application to the case at 
bar. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
SUSTAINED ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THAT A MAIN CHANNEL 
OF THE WEBER RIVER DID NOT EXIST UNTIL 1894. 
Admittedly, Judge Roth did rule that the "... burden 
of proving the location of the property in question lies with the 
Defendant, Utah Department of Transportation.11 (R. 491). 
The Appellants have misconstrued the Court's ruling 
when they state on Pages 28 and 29 of their Brief, that the 
Respondents "...failed to prove that the subject property was 
located in Weber County in 1866." 
The Trial Court ruled after hearing all of the evidence 
in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of its Conclusions of Law: 
"1. The preponderance of evidence shows that the 
location of the Weber River in 1866, cannot be determined. 
2. The prior surveys indicated that the Weber River 
was subject to change." 
The foregoing comes as a result of two days of trial. 
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The transcript, shows that the Respondents (Defendants) were. 
required to proceed first in the lawsuit. Apparentlyf the 
Respondents must have met their burden of proof since the Court 
ruled after hearing all of the evidence that the preponderance of 
evidence shows that the location of the Weber River in 1866 could 
not be determined. AJLOU, the Appellants did not make a motion 
for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the Respondents1 case 
in chief. (T. 113). 
POINT III 
THE 1894 SURVEY OF THE WEBER RIVER WAS CONDUCTED 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 86.2 COMPILED LAWS OF UTAH 
1888f WHICH ALLOWS THE COUNTY SURVEYOR TO SURVEY 
COUNTY BOUNDARIES WHEN AN UNCERTAINTY SHALL ARISE. 
The Court in Paragraph 4 of its Conclusions of Law 
stated the following: 
"That a definite uncertainty existed as to the 
location of the Weber River, which caused an uncertainty as to 
the county boundary, and pursuant to statute, this uncertainty 
may be determined by county surveyors and was done in 1894, and 
that survey established the boundary between the two counties. 
(R. 518) . 
The Appellants in their Brief rely upon the testimony 
of Mr. Earl Kendall to establish the existence of an old rock 
wall that had been built. The testimony was based upon what Mr. 
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Kendall's father told him, which was clearly hearsay and was 
objected to by Respondents' counsel. (R. 124-126). 
The Trial Court must have elected to believe the 
testimony of Mr. Jack DeMass because he testified that the rock 
wall was constructed at the time the highway up Weber Canyon was 
constructed. (R. 766-767). Mr. DeMass identified Exhibit 25 as 
the plans from which the road was built. (Copy attached marked 
Exhibit "M"). The rock wall was constructed at the time the 
highway was constructed for the purpose of preventing erosion to 
the new highway. (R. 768). (Exhibit D-25 attached Exhibit "M") . 
The Appellants in their Brief make the assertion 
that no evidence was presented by the Appellants that in fact a 
dispute existed between Davis and Weber Counties. 
Mr. Elliot/ the Davis County Surveyor, researched the 
Davis County notes which were referred to as (D-3). Both Davis 
and Weber Counties had access to the Surveyor General1s notes. 
(R. 561). Also, on Page 15 of Exhibit D-3, Timothy Kendall was 
complaining in 1894 that he was being taxed in both Davis and 
Weber Counties. Also, on Page 15 (January, 1893), the Clerk of 
Davis County wrote to the Clerk of Weber County for notes of the 
survey of the line between Davis and Weber Counties, and received 
the answer that the Weber Surveyor had no notes. The Davis 
County Clerk also stated he investigated the complaint of Timothy 
Kendall and concluded he did pay taxes in both counties, but 
could not determine the amount of land involved because of "... 
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the county line not being properly located in that county." (See 
Exhibits "H" and "I".) 
Also, on Page 22 of Exhibit D-3, it states that "E-A. 
Vail has been waiting for necessary data to-wit, the notes of the 
county line between Weber and Davis Counties ..." 
On Page 27 of D-3. The matter of previously locating 
the county line between Davis and Weber Counties was referred to 
the surveyor to confer with the authorities of Weber County with 
a view to permanently locating said line. (April 2, 1894, 
Exhibit "J") 
On Page 40 of Exhibit D-3, the Clerk was instructed to 
record the survey notes of the county line between Weber and 
Davis Counties in the county record. (May 7, 1894). In 
accordance with the foregoing, the survey notes of county line 
common to Davis and Weber Counties were recorded in the Davis 
County Commission Minutes on Page 41 of D-3, copy attached, 
marked Exhibit "Kn. 
The Appellants introduced Exhibit D-19 tor the purpose 
of showing that as late as 1904 a dispute still existed between 
Davis and Weber Counties. This particular Exhibit in no way 
refers to any problems that existed in the area of the subject 
property. 
The two counties in their attempt to survey the 
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location of the Weber River were not attempting to relocate the 
county linef but merely resolve an uncertainty as to where the 
Weber River was in fact located, 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT RULED THAT ESTOPPEL BY DEED HAS 
NO APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR. (R. 460). 
The Appellants place a lot of emphasis in the fact that 
a quiet title action was held and a decree issued on the 25th day 
of March, 1946. (R. 405-406). The two descriptions set forth on 
the decree are outlined on the aerial photo located between Pages 
432 and 433 of the record. The Weber County description is out-
lined in yellow, the Davis County description is outlined in red 
and the subject property in blue. (Cop^ attached/ marked Exhibit 
"L") . As should be readily visible to this Court, the six acres 
in question was quieted in both Davis and Weber Counties. The 
Appellants in their assertions to this Court have seemingly 
ignored and misconstrued the doctrine of estoppel by Deed. In 
the very first quote contained in their Brief# 28 Am. Jur. 2d 
Estoppel and Waiver Section 4, the Appellants attempt to define 
estoppel by Deed. The very essence of this concept contemplates 
that one party to a Deed is estopped from denying the truth of 
facts contained in the Deed which he gave to another party. In 
the present case, the Appellants are asserting because a prior 
quiet title action (R. 405-406) alleges certain property to be 
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located in Weber County (outlined in yellow on Exhibit "L") and 
other property was located in Davis County (outlined in red on 
Exhibit "L"), this creates an estoppel by Deed. The subject six 
acres property is outlined on the same Exhibit in blue. It is 
readily apparent that the descriptions contained in the decree 
put the six acres in both counties. Consequently, the decree 
really stands for nothing insofar as any type estoppel is 
concerned. 
The Appellants quote Section 8 in their memorandum and 
in the last section states that estoppel is only operable between 
the actual parties and their privies to the Deed; strangers are 
not bound. There are absolutely no privity between the Appel-
lants and the Respondent Utah Department of Transportation and 
this is evidenced by the decision of the Supreme Court previously 
issued in this case. 
The leading case in Utah on this doctrine is Douse v. 
Kanmernan, et al., 122 U. 85 246 P.2d 881 (1952). In this case 
the Plaintiff originally acquired the property in question by Tax 
Sale Deed. The Plaintiff then sold the property by Quit Claim 
Deed. Subsequently, the Plaintiff acquired title from the prior 
record title holder. The Plaintiff was not estopped from assert-
ing the validity of the prior Tax Sale from which he obtained his 
original Tax Deed. The Court held that estoppel by Deed operates 
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only where the conveyance is intended to convey a particular 
estatef which the Grantor subsequently acquires/ the Grantor then 
becomes estopped to deny an after acquired titled/ and conse-
quently/ becomes estopped to defeat his original grant. This has 
no application to the case at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed in 
favor of the Respondents, Utah Department of Transportation, 
Davis County and Weber County. 
Respectfully submitted
 9 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ST-EPHENyC. WARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
y ^ - v ^ w H ^ XK2-
GERALD HESS 
Assistant Davis County Attorney 
• / 
&dji±ALkid£ 
CHRIS DAVIS 
Assistant Weber County Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing 
Respondents1 Brief, were mailed, postage prepaid, to Glen E. 
Fuller, 245 N. Vine Street #608, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103, 
Chris Davis, Weber County Attorney, Weber County Courthouse, 
Ogden, Utah 84401, and Gerald Hess, Assistant Davis County 
Attorney, Davis County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, this / / 
day of September, 1987. 
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EXHIBITS 
STEPHEN C. WARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 533-6684 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD A, TOONE, : 
Plaintiff, : 
-v- : 
LEGRANDE JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
: 
Defendant and Third 
Party Plaintiff, : 
-v- : 
ROBERT REES DANSIE and : 
MARIE GROW DANSIE, his wife; 
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, : 
DAVIS COUNTY ASSESSOR, and 
DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER, : 
Third Party Defendants. : 
This matter came on for trial on the 13th day of 
December, 1976, before the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge of 
this court. The plaintiff, Ronald A. Toone, was represented 
by his attorney, Glen E. Fuller; the defendant, LeGrande 
son Construction Company, was represented by their attorney, 
diepnen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General; the third party 
defendants, Davis County, were represented by their attorney, 
Steven C. Vanderlinden, Deputy Davis County Attorney, and the 
third party defendants, Dansies, were represented by Robert 
Rees Dansie. A jury of eight persons was regularly impaneled 
and sworn totay said action. Witnesses on behalf of both 
parties were sworn and testified concerning the location of the 
S»5 of N*5 of the SW% of Section 25, 
5 N., 1 W., S.L.M. containing 18 acres. 
After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, and the 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
AND ORDER OF TEE COURT 
Civil No. 20915 
instructions of the court, the jury retired to consider their 
verdict, taking with them the exhibits which had been offered 
and received and the written instructions of the court. The 
jury subsequently returned to the court, and through its foreman, 
Aid they answered the single interrogatory submitted to them 
as follows: 
"Do you find it proven by a preponderance 
of evidence that the land in question lies 
within the boundaries of Weber County, Utah?" 
Answer: Yes. 
Wherefore, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premise 
aforesaid, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiff's 
Complaint is hereby dismissed. That the westerly six (6) acres 
located in the 
Sh of the North h of the SWJ* of Section 25, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey is located in 
Weber County. 
The court hereby reserves to the plaintiff, the 
right to cross plead against the third party defendant, Davis 
County, as to any cause of action the plaintiff may have. 
Dated this 7 c~ day of Jfrff/zJlsUA/ , 1977. 
com V? »AV« eouwH\WAK PO M W « W 
nSTTHi AMNBOB V k***0~* • A VIM AMD 
RJU con o* AM oowiui »ocuMPtr M A I M 
B1KTHE COUR 
T M B w ^ ^ O ^ — j ^ ^ d ^ ^ . ' J^JDCTCAIAflNGOUI^ 
IT _u&fcdty^ 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment on Verdict 
and Order of the Court to Glen E. Fuller, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
15 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Robert Dansie, 
Attorney for Defendants, Dansies, 5085 South State Street, Murray, 
Utah 84107; and Steven Vanderlinden, Deputy Davis County 
Attorney, Attorney for Defendants, Davis County, Davis County 
Courthouse, Farmington, Utah 84025, this J day of 
-A*W N , 1977. 
s.. 
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1 strongly than what the Court did, your Honor. The Court said 
2 the boundary was established by description, and Mr. Fuller 
3 goes on to say was not only established, but was determined to 
4 be the main channel of the Weber River in the area of the 
5
 subject property. He has gone just that much farther. 
6 And secondly, your Honor, he has gone on to further 
7
 state what the Court then went on to say, the Plaintiffs 
8 contentions after that first paragraph. The Court went on and 
9 J said Plaintiff contends, plaintiff argues, and further— 
THE COURT: ...You quarrel v/ith number two as being a 
• \ 
H correct statement of law? 
12 MR. WARD: Well, I don't know it is that easy because 
13 there^was no main channel of the Weber River. And I think to 
14 include that now might prejudice us later on to the effect that 
15 I the Court has concluded there was a main channel of the Weber 
Rive r . AJid.^ V^ <3A^ J^Lh^ XiLJ^ A£..JI.Ot. 
THE COURT: Okay, suppose we ask the Jury number one, 
in 1866, can it be determined there wasa mainwchannel 
Weber River at the place in question, yes__orjno. If_XQ^_an^w^jr^ld 
yes, was that main channel north or^south^jsms^ 
Number three, was there eyidencevof a sudden shift placing it 
south? Those three issues for the Jury. You call your experts, 
your surveyors, diagramsf maps. You do the same thing, let thenj 
decide it. 
MR. WARD: In essence, ves. 
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DAVID W. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DONALD S. COLEMAN, Chief - Bar No. 0695 
Physical Resources Division 
STEPHEN C. WARD - Bar No. 3384 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Utah Department of Transportation 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 363-7187 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
RONALD L. BAXTER and SHIRLEY 
DIANE BAXTER, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD., a 
Utah Corporation, 
An Involuntary 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant, Third-
Party Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT REES DANSIE and MARIE 
GROW DANSIE, his wife; DAVIS 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; DAVIS 
COUNTY ASSESSOR; DAVIS 
COUNTY RECORDER; and WEBER 
COUNTY, a Body Politic of 
the State of Utah, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
RULING ON ORDER OF REMAND 
Civil No. 74206 
(Supreme Court No. 86-0562) 
RE: Defendant's Motion 
to Strike Exhibits 
In this action the above-named Plaintiffs Baxter filed 
an Appeal from the Judgment of this Court entered on October 6, 
1986, setting forth in their Brief on Appeal that certain 
Exhibits used at the time of trial in this Court supported their 
argument for a reversal of the aforesaid Judgment; and Defendant 
Utah Department of Transportation having thereupon filed with the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah a Motion to Strike said 
Exhibits; to-wit Defendants Exhibits D-14, D-15, and D-15, 
contending in said Motion that the foregoing three (3) numbered 
Exhibits had never been offered and received in evidence; and 
After having considered Defendants Motion to Strike, 
based upon written Affidavits and Memoranda and a hearing, the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah remanded the said Motion to 
Strike to this Court for the purpose of making determinations on 
specific issues set forth in the Order of Remand; and 
The matter came on for hearing before the Honorable 
Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge, on Friday, May 22, 1987, at the 
hour of 11:00 a.nu, Plaintiffs appearing by and through Glen E. 
Fuller, their attorney, and Defendant Utah Department of Trans-
portation appearing by and through Stephen C. Ward, Assistant 
Attorney General; and respective counsel argued the matter and 
the Court thereupon examined the record and considered the same, 
and being fully advised in the premises hereby determines and 
orders that the issues certified to this Court by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah be, and they hereby are, answered as 
follows: 
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1. Did this Court receive Exhibits D-14, D-15, and 
D-16 in evidence: 
ABSWER: Yes, the Court relied upon the fact that the 
Exhibit Sheet prepared by the Clerk of the Court showed the 
Exhibits as being received into evidence. 
2. Did this Court have the Exhibits before it for the 
purpose of making its decision in this matter? 
ANSWER: Yesf the Court orally indicated that it 
remembered the Exhibits and what was contained thereon. 
Page 16 of the Transcript: 
Well, if they were utilized during the questioning of 
witnesses, I certainly looked at them. 
Page 18 of the Transcript: 
That they were received, apparently, and were not taken 
into chambers. 
I don't know they would have made any difference if I 
did have them, but apparently that's where it stands. 
Page 19 of the Transcript: 
They were not taken into chambers. I recall seeing 
them. I can remember them to that extent. 
DATED this day of June, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
RONALD 0. HYDE 
District Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
STE&BM CJ( WARD 
Attorney for Utah 
Department of Transportation 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing RULING ON ORDER OF REMAND was mailed by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid, to Glen E. Fuller, 245 North Vine Street, 
#608, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103; Gerald E. Hess, Assistant Davis 
County Attorney, County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah 84025; and 
Chris Davis, Deputy Weber County Attorney, Weber County Municipal 
Building, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 10th day of July, 1987. 
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